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The relation of economic privilege to political power is a prominent issue 
in American social science, and one approach to its study has led to the exami­
nation of elite recruitment and activity. All studies of this topic have found 
considerable overrepresentation of men from upper and upper middle class fami­
lies in top positions in powerful public and private sector institutions (e.g., 
Matthews, I960; Keller, 1963; Mintz, 1975; Dye, 1979). Prewitt and Stone 
(1973; 136) summarize the evidence with the statement:
The tiny group, consisting primarily of men, that directs 
the political economy of the United States is overwhelmingly 
recruited from the wealthier families of society. Few per­
sons reach elite positions in political and economic life 
unless they are born to wealth, acquire it fairly early in 
life, or at least have access to it.
Moreover, privileged social origins characterize large proportions of leaders 
in all groups examined not only in the United States but also in dozens of 
other countries (see Putnam, 1976 for a review of the literature).
Most research, measuring social origins by father's occupation, has found 
that those with professional or managerial fathers are disproportionately repre­
sented in elite positions (e.g., Keller, 1963). Others attempt to identify a 
far smaller group (less than 1% of the population), the upper class, and study 
its occupancy of top positions (Domhoff, .1967, 1971; Dye, 1979). Domhoff, using 
such facts as attendance at an elite prep school or membership in an exclusive 
social club as indicators of upper class membership, concludes that the upper 
class is found in top institutional positions far in excess of its proportions 
in the population as a whole (1967, 1971). He argues further that its 
overrepresentation is due to its cohesion and group consciousness. In his view, 
upper-class cohesion rests on an exclusive nationwide network of informal 
connections, including attendance at select private schools, membership in 
exclusive private clubs, vacations at specific resorts and intermarriage
(1967, 1971; Baltzell, 1964; Blumberg and Paul, 1975).
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Members of the upper class, sharing both similar origins and
experiences and linked indirectly and directly, tend to trust one another more 
than outsiders. As a result, non-members are handicapped in the achievement 
of an elite position because they are excluded from the social institutions 
in which important informal relations are forged.
Despite the overwhelming consistency of the evidence on social origins 
and elite recruitment, very important questions remain. Thus, while the social 
homogeneity of American elites in the past is well documented, the current ex­
tent of homogeneity is open to question, as some have found heterogeneity to 
be increasing. For example, reviewing the social class origins of elite mem­
bers in several institutional sectors through the early 1960's, Keller found 
some evidence that the representation of those from working class origins was 
growing (Keller, 1963: 205-7). Nevertheless, she declared that social class
factors continue to play a significant role in elite recruitment. Also without 
a definitive answer is whether the relative importance of social origins for 
elite entry varies by institutional sector. Putnam, for one, after reviewing 
numerous studies of elite recruitment, concludes that business elites tend to 
come from the most privileged origins, followed next by top-level federal 
officials and then by federal legislators (Putnam, 1976: 22-26).
Little is known about the role of social origins once an elite position 
has been attained. If Domhoff's argument on the importance of interaction in 
upper-class social institutions is correct, one would expect upper-class origins 
to be advantageous even within elite groups. This would result in differentia­
tion within elite groups according to social origins, with key positions and
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network centrality being disproportionately held by those from the upper class. 
But this expectation is contradicted by the implications of the 
pluralist view. In general, pluralists contend that the link between class 
background and policy-making behavior is weak (e.g., Polsby, 1980). Implied 
is that, although privileged social origins may be an asset in the achievement 
of an elite position, they are of little consequence to activities or positions 
within the elite.
A final related issue concerns the kind of origins that matter for the 
achievement of an elite position. As some recent research has emphasized (e.g. 
Wright and Perrone, 1977; Wright, 1979; Robinson and Kelley, 1979), the bulk of 
American stratification research over the last few decades has concerned dimen­
sions of status; that is, it is based on a conception of stratification as a 
continuum of fine distinctions, without sharp breaks or boundaries, and has 
focused on what might be taken as indicators of generalized prestige, such as 
occupation and education. In contrast to this tradition, recent research in 
a neo-Marxist spirit has revived the categorical notion of class, which derives 
from the organization of production. A measure of class position in the social 
relations of production has been found to be at least as useful as the tradi­
tional status variables in predicting income (Wright and Perrone, 1977; Wright, 
1979) .
With some notable exceptions, such as the work of Domhoff, most research 
on elite origins derives from the status conception of stratification. But 
both status and class deserve consideration in an examination of the impact of 
social origins on elite position. On behalf of a consideration of class, the 
view of Marxist class analysis can be noted— namely, that ownership of a busi­
ness and control over the labor of others confer distinct advantages to members 
of the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and, in contemporary capitalism, managers
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These groups are seen as uniquely able to accumulate wealth and political power 
(Wright, 1979: 224). In addition, growing up in a property-owning rather than
a laboring family might offer related cultural and social skills such as exper­
ience in giving rather than taking orders and a belief in one's leadership 
ability.
In this paper, we examine the relationship of class and status origins to 
elite positions, using a unique sample of interviews with top position holders 
in powerful public and private sector organizations in 1971-72. We address the 
following major questions: (1) What is the representation of individuals from
different class and status groups in the American elite? (2) To what extent . 
are there differences along these lines within the elite in such matters as 
routes of entry into it or current standing in it? (3) Are there marked ten­
dencies for interaction within the elite to take place along class or status 
lines?
DATA
The data we use are taken from the American Leadership Study, conducted 
by the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University in 1971-72. These 
data are well suited for examining the above questions since they include exten­
sive social background, current activity and sociometric information for a sample 
of 545 elite position holders in a variety of institutional sectors that have a 
broad impact on policymaking and political processes in the United States. Ten 
sectors were selected for study on the basis that their leaders appear to exert 
significant influence on electoral politics, governmental actions, the definition 
of national issues or public opinion. These are: Fortune 500 industrial corpor­
ations; Fortune 300 non-industrial corporations; holders of large fortunes (these 
first three we combine into a single "Business" sector); labor unions; political 
parties; voluntary organizations; mass media; Congress; political appointees in
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the federal government; and federal civil servants. We refer to the top posi­
tion holders in these institutions as the elite, although we recognize that 
others might define the national elite in somewhat different terms.
Within each sector, a random sample of approximately 50 persons was inter­
viewed. The 484 resulting interviews constituted the positional sample. It 
was supplemented by a snowball sample of 61 other persons named as influential 
by several of the original respondents. However, the analysis reported here 
uses data only from the positional interviews. We exclude the snowball inter­
views because a comparison of the social origins of snowball and positional 
sample members revealed that the former group had a greater proportion of 
fathers with high status occupations and a college degree. The completion rate 
for the positional sample was 73%.
The design in terms of sectors, although a necessity in a broad elite 
study, causes problems for any analysis. The definition of the sampling uni­
verse varies by sector so that, in this sense, the study is composed of ten 
distinct samples. Moreover, the sectors probably do not have equal influence 
on national policy, although it is not possible to assign a meaningful weight 
to the influence of each. To meet these problems, wherever possible we report 
results by sector or, at least, control for sector in our analysis. Nonetheless, 
for convenience in summarizing, we at times use figures for the overall sample.
The data include detailed social origins, such as the occupation and 
education of the respondent and his or her parents, as well as extensive 
information on his or her attitudes on national issues, current activities and 
organizational memberships. These two last are of special relevance for an 
elite study. For example, from the very detailed information about organizationa 
memberships, we are able to identify whether the respondent belongs to any 
upper-class social clubs (listed by Domhoff, 1971, ch. 1) and whether he or she
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is a member of the major policy-planning organizations (Moore, 1979: 685). 
Each respondent was also asked to report memberships on boards of trustees, 
boards of directors, and Federal government advisory committees; testimony 
before Congressional committees; as well as recent press or television 
interviews, speeches given, and other indicators of communications output.
We use this information to create measures of elite-related activities (for 
details, see Moore, 1979: 684-689). Finally, the interviews focused in part 
on the respondent's policy-related activities on a national issue in which 
he or she recently had been deeply involved. A series of sociometric 
questions asked for the names of persons with whom he or she discussed
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the issue as well as those the respondent believed to be nationally influential 
on it. We use these to construct various sociometric measures.
Classifying elite members' social origins
In classifying elite social origins, we use both a neo-Marxist definition 
of class and the more usual parental occupation and education variables. Because 
the class variable is less familiar and its categories are subject to dispute (see 
Robinson and Kelley, 1979; Attewell and Fitzgerald, 1980; Aldrich and Weiss,
1981), we explain in detail our definition and operationalization of it.
According to Wright and Perrone (1979: 33), the traditional Marxist con­
cept of class results in the identification of three major classes in capitalist 
society: (1) capitalists: those who own the means of production and employ
others, (2) the petty bourgeoisie: those who own the means of production but
do not employ others, and (3) workers: those who do not own the means of pro­
duction and work for others. Wright and Perrone argue that in contemporary 
capitalist society, it is reasonable to distinguish a fourth important group, 
managers: those who do not own the means of production but who supervise the
work of others (Wright and Perrone, 1977: 34).
One difficulty with this scheme is the absence of a clear boundary between 
the capitalist class and the petit bourgeoisie (Wright and Perrone, 1977;
Aldrich and Weiss, 1981: 280-2). It is not clear whether one employee is
sufficient to make one a capitalist or whether a distinction should be made 
between large and small employers. Aldrich and Weiss (1981), in particular, 
argue that workforce size is a crucial variable which must be considered in 
analysis of the capitalist class. In order to incorporate a distinction based 
on workforce size, we have chosen to classify business owners with ten or more 
employees as capitalists and those with 0-9 employees as petty bourgeoisie. 
Although somewhat arbitrary, this cutting point has the virtue of allowing a
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comparison to the class composition of the United States as determined by Wright 
and Perrone.
Hence, we classify individuals on the basis of father's social class 
according to the following categories:
1. capitalist: owner of business with at least 10 employees
2. petty bourgeois: owner of business with 0-9 employees
3. manager: supervises work of others but not self-employed
24. worker: not self-employed and does not supervise the work of others
Our classification of elite individuals according to father's occupation
and parental education follows more conventional lines. In classifying by 
father's occupation, we distinguish professional, proprietary, and managerial 
occupations from other white-collar workers; additionally, we retain a broad 
category for blue-collar occupations and one for farm owners.
In terms of parental education, we distinguish college-educated parents from 
others.^
Social origins in the American elite
The first question to be addressed is: what are the class and status ori­
gins of the American elite? Related to this is the question of how the social 
origins of the elite compare to those of the general population. Are those with 
high status parents overrepresented in the elite, as past studies have found?
Do disproportionate numbers of the offspring of the capitalist class occupy 
elite positions? We answer these questions in this section. In the next, we 
consider the relationship of social origins to position and activities within 
the elite.
Table 1 presents the basic data on social origins, including father's 
class, occupation and education and mother's education. It shows these by insti­
tutional sector as well as for the entire elite sample. In order to assess
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over - or underrepresentation, the table also provides comparable parental class, 
occupation and education data for the American population.
The general population data for father's occupation and parents' educations
are calculated from the combined NORC General Social Surveys for 1972-80. Since
nearly all members of the elite sample are male (95%) and were over 40 at the
time they were interviewed (94%), these two characteristics have been used to
4define the relevant American population for comparison. There is great dif­
ficulty in obtaining population data for father's social class as we have 
defined it. Ideally, the data would characterize the older male population from 
which the elite is drawn, referring in historical terms, to the class composi­
tion of the population during the 1920's and 1930's, when most of our respon­
dents were growing up. But we could not find this information. We use instead 
the only data we could locate on class composition of the U.S. population as 
defined here, taken from the 1969 Survey of Working Conditions, as reported by 
Wright and Perrone (1977). In comparison to the 1920's and 1930's, these data 
probably overstate the proportion of managers, while understating those of 
workers and members of the petty bourgeoisie. Nonetheless, we think that the 
general pattern of class origins in the elite is clear enough to withstand any 
ambiguity caused by the absence of an exact standard of comparison.5
The most striking result in the table is the strong overrepresentation of 
those from capitalist families in the elite. Over one in five members of the 
elite sample come from such origins, but only one in sixty members of the 
comparable population group is in this category. Also overrepresented in the 
sample are persons from petit bourgeois origins, with over a fourth of 
the sample but only 10% of the population in this group. Combining the two 
categories of ownership shows that nearly one in two sample members had a father
who owned his own business. On the other hand, workers' sons and daughters are
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greatly underrepresented in the sample— about 16% versus nearly half of the 
population. The children of managerial fathers are found in the elite sample 
in roughly the same proportion as in the population.
Moreover, the children of business owners are not concentrated in just a few 
sectors, but are overrepresented in all the sectors in the survey. The labor 
sector has the sparsest representation of this group and by far the highest 
representation of the sons and daughters of workers. With the additional 
exceptions of civil servants and the media, at least half of every sector is 
composed of the children of owners. This proportion rises to two-thirds among 
party leaders and those in Congress. Indeed, nearly a third of Congress is 
composed of the children of capitalist fathers; this group also comprises over 
a quarter of business leaders.
The elite sample is also unrepresentative of the general population in 
terms of father's occupation. Nearly three out of five fathers of elite sample 
members were in high status white-collar positions (professional, proprietor,6 
manager) compared to about one in six in the comparison group.
Most sectors roughly approximate the occupational distribution of the 
sample as a whole, with about 50-60% having high-status white-collar fathers.
As was true of father's social class, the major sectoral exception from the 
general pattern is found among labor leaders: three-fourths are the children
of blue-collar or service workers, a far higher proportion than in the sample 
as a whole (or the population, for that matter), and only 19% have high-status 
white-collar fathers. An exception in the other direction is the media, where 
three-quarters have high-status fathers, including 40% who are the children of 
professionals. Business leaders also have a high percentage (71%) of high- 
status fathers. Congress is unusual for its higher proportion of farm-owner 
fathers, probably reflecting the rural origins of many members of that sector.
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The overrepresentation of the children of high-status fathers in most 
elite sectors suggests that elites' parents had more education than most others 
of their generations. This is indeed the case, as the last two columns of 
Table 1 show. One third of fathers and one fifth of mothers of elite sample 
members graduated from college, at times when tiny proportions of the population 
had as much education. In specific sectors, namely Congress and labor, fewer 
mothers and fathers of elite members had college educations, but only for the 
mothers of labor leaders does the proportion in an elite sector come close to 
that of the population. Again, the media are an exception in the other direction; 
a very high proportion of their fathers, but not of their mothers, had a 
college education. In other sectors, the percentage of parents who are college 
graduates is close to that in the overall sample.
The combination of class and status dimensions sheds an interesting light 
on Putnam's (1976: 22-26) well-known generalization that business leaders are 
from more privileged origins than political administrators, who in turn have 
higher origins than legislative elites. The differences in status origins among 
sectors generally are in accord with Putnam's statement. Thus, in compar­
ison to political appointees and members of Congress, a very high percentage of 
the fathers of business leaders fall into the three high-status occupational 
categories. And of the three sectors, Congress has the lowest percentage of 
fathers in the top occupational categories and also the lowest percentage of 
parents with college educations. But in terms of the class dimension, the mem­
bers of Congress move from the bottom to the top. They have the highest percent­
age of fathers who were owners and also the highest percentage of capitalist 
fathers. The discrepancy is a result of the high percentage of fathers of 
members of Congress who were farm owners, a group which falls into the owner 
class but is placed low in terms of occupational prestige. Accordingly, the
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class dimension imparts a different perception of elite social origins than do 
the status dimensions.
Overall, the class and status origins of the elite sample are far different 
from those of the comparison groups in the U.S. population. Elites are far more 
likely to come from occupationally and educationally privileged families than 
are non-elite persons. This is not, of course, a surprising finding, but what 
is striking among the differences in social origins of elite and non-elite per­
sons is the large percentage of elites from capitalist families. Origins in 
the capitalist class appear to be a significant advantage in achieving a top 
level position in a powerful public or private institution.
Differentiation by socioeconomic origins within the elite
Two broad questions concerning differences by class and status origins 
within the elite remain. First, are elite members from different class and 
status backgrounds similar with respect to other background factors, such as 
types of education? It may be, for example, that whatever their origins elite 
members tend to have attended the most prestigious colleges, that these schools 
serve as entry portals, even for those from the least favored backgrounds. 
Second, do social origins coincide with differences in elite position, as indi­
cated by current activities or influence? Much of the literature suggests that 
common origins and common culture form the cement for powerful informal networks 
within the elite. If so, then those entering the elite from less favored back­
grounds may remain on the periphery of influence, while those from the most 
favored backgrounds may be at its center.
Both of these questions are addressed by the results reported in Table 2.
The table shows the results of regression analyses of five social background
characteristics, seven current activity measures, and three sociometric vari- 
7ables. Because we are interested in whether these variables are related to
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class and status background, they are the dependent variables in the regressions.
The class and status background variables, which are represented by sets of dummy
0
variables, are independent variables in regressions run separately for each of
2them. For each, the first column reports the increment to the R produced when
9the variable is added to an equation already containing sector. The remaining
columns for the variable report the coefficients of its dummy variables. These
coefficients have been calculated in such a way that they represent differences,
in standard deviation units of the dependent variable, and with sector controlled,
between each category represented by a dummy variable and the so-called omitted
category. The significance tests for the coefficients are, then, tests of those
differences; the overall effect of each class or status variable is tested by
2its increment to the R .
2An example may help to clarify this set-up. The R increment of father's 
social class to the equation for the COLLEGE variable shows that class background 
is significantly related to the quality of the college attended by an elite sample 
member, even with sector controlled. The coefficient of petit bourgeois origins 
shows that those from such origins were less likely, by .50 standard deviation 
units, to attend high-prestige colleges than were those from capitalist origins, 
who form the omitted category. This difference is with sector controlled.
To begin with, class and status background is related, and sometimes strongly 
so, to the other aspects of social background that we have analyzed here. The 
relation of father's class to the background variables generally demonstrates 
the advantages of those with capitalist origins (the omitted category).
These are visible in the overall pattern of differences in the education variables, 
and especially in the differences in attendance at an elite private high
school (PREPSCHL). Contrary to what might be expected, however, the children of
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small entrepreneurs are not the next most advantaged group. Indeed, in 
educational terms, they seem the least advantaged of the four groups. There is 
little difference between the children of managers and those of workers, although 
it deserves note that the former come from the oldest American families (GENRES).
Regarding father's occupation, advantages in background adhere to those 
with professional fathers (the omitted category) or managerial ones, with the 
children of proprietors and other white-collar workers generally not far behind. 
Specifically, the children of professional and managerial fathers are the most 
likely to have attended elite private schools and high-quality colleges. Falling 
at the bottom in both these respects are the children of blue-collar and farm 
origins. These two groups are clearly the least advantaged in general background, 
as they also have less education (OWNED) than those in the four white-collar 
categories. In addition, the children of blue-collar fathers come from the 
most recently arrived families.
Finally, in terms of parental education, the children of college-educated
parents are generally the most advantaged in overall social background. Although
the differences made by mother's education are not that large, as is indicated by
2the relatively small R figures, the differences associated with father's educa­
tion are defined fairly sharply. The children of fathers who earned at least a 
baccalaureate have attended more prestigious educational institutions, and the 
children of fathers with the very highest educational credentials, a post­
baccalaureate degree (the omitted category), have themselves the highest educa­
tional attainment. Father's education is also associated with generations of 
residence in the United States.
By and large, the differences we have just described form a set of related 
differences in background that, broadly speaking, constitute what most would
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expect to find. It is worth noting, nonetheless, that the parallels do not hold 
in every detail. There are not, for example, neatly graduated differences for 
each step in father's social class, as we have already called to attention in 
the extreme differences within the sample between the children of capitalists 
and those of the petty bourgeoisie.
We are now at the point of asking what these differences in class and status 
origins imply about current position within the elite. The answer, first of all, 
is: less than one might think. For most of the indicators of current position
and influence in the elite, class and status origins make little or no differ-
2ence when their effects are assessed by a difference-of-R test. Among the 
sociometric indicators, for instance, there is only one significant relation by 
this test. Among the indicators of current activities and visibility, 
there are no significant differences for the number of federal advisory boards 
(FEDADV) or corporate boards (CORPDIR) on which an individual sits, the number 
of times he or she has testified before Congress (TESTCONG), or the level of 
that person's communications output (COMMOUT). Although there are occasionally 
significant regression coefficients for some of these variables (e.g., for the 
children of workers on level of communications output), their presence does not 
change the general pattern of little or no relation.
On the whole, those indicators of current activities for which class and 
status origins make the most difference are the ones often thought to reflect 
the influence of an "upper class," expressed in large part through informal 
connections. These indicators include membership in exclusive social clubs 
(ELCLUBS), on the boards of trustees of non-profit organizations (NONPROF), and 
in influential policy-planning organizations (ELITEORG). By and large, the
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differences on these indicators correspond with the differences in general social 
background we have identified above.
2Judging again by a difference-of-R test, membership in exclusive social 
clubs is associated with father's class and education. In terms of class 
origins, the children of capitalists are the most likely to belong to such 
clubs, followed by the children of managers. In terms of father's education, 
the children of college graduates or those with post-graduate educations are 
the most likely to belong, while the children of fathers who did not graduate 
from high school are the least likely. Membership on the boards of trustees of 
nonprofit organizations is associated with father's class, occupation, and edu­
cation. The differences according to father's class and education parallel those 
for club membership. In terms of father's occupation, those of blue-collar and 
farm origins are less likely to be non-profit board members than are the child­
ren of white-collar fathers.
The biggest differences by background are for membership in elite policy­
planning organizations, such as the Business Council and the Council on Foreign 
Relations, that are thought to be a key channel for upper-class influence on 
national policy (e.g., Domhoff, 1979; Dye, 1979). But father's class is 
not related to this sort of membership? rather, father's occupation and education 
are. The differences associated with father's education are somewhat unantici­
pated, as the children of fathers with post-baccalaureate degrees are among the 
least likely to be members. The differences associated with father's occupation 
are more expected and also large in magnitude. The children of professionals, 
followed by the children of managers, are most likely to belong; the children of 
lower white-collar workers and of farm owners are least likely.
These differences in elite activities are worthy of attention
because of the significance that is often attributed to them.
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But it must be noted that the differences asso­
ciated with background are, on the whole, not large, as is indicated by the 
2size of the R increases reported in the table and the magnitudes of the regres­
sion coefficients. Only in one instance does a background variable add more 
than 3% to the variance explained by sector membership. And only a few of the 
differences among categories of a background variable are larger than .4 
standard deviation units. That these are indeed signs of relations of 
only modest strength is brought out by a comparison to the regression results 
for the other social background variables, such as attendance at a select 
prep school.
In terms of a larger picture, the results of this section are quite funda­
mental. We have already noted that class and status background has an important 
bearing on entry into the elite. This is especially true, of course, for father's 
social class. Further, according to the results presented early in this 
section, class and status origins correspond with other background differences 
that might be expected to affect position and influence within the elite.
They affect not only the amount of education received but the prestige and 
quality of the educational institutions an elite person has attended. And 
they correspond with differences in generations of family residence in the 
United States. But class and status origins are surprisingly weak in predicting 
indicators of current elite position and influence. These origins are 
consistently related to only a few indicators, such as membership in exclusive 
social clubs. These few indicators do have an important theoretical status, 
but they are only weakly associated with class and status background.
Homophily in elite interaction
The proposition that informal relations tend to occur on the basis of
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common origins and culture is often viewed as central to the presumed hegemony 
of elite individuals of upper-class origins. This proposition is an instance 
of the homophily principle, which holds that persons tend to interact with 
others like themselves (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954). We have already tested 
it indirectly through the relation of class and status origins to sociometric 
indicators such as the number of interaction nominations an individual receives 
from others in the elite sample. These tests are indirect because the indica­
tors were constructed by aggregation; hence, the equality of individuals of 
different socioeconomic origins could mask a tendency for interaction at the 
individual level to run along lines determined by origins.
To test the homophily principle directly, we use part of the data that 
provided the basis for the sociometric measures of the last section —  
specifically, the nominations respondents provided when asked to name those 
with whom they were in personal contact concerning their issue of activity.10 
In this section, we report briefly an analysis of who named whom, focusing 
specifically on the extent to which respondents named others with the same 
class and status origins as themselves. Our analysis is based on who-to-whom 
tables, in which characteristics of respondents are tabulated by the same 
characteristics of the persons they named.
In constructing such a table, we can only use nominations to other sample 
members, since only for these do we know the socioeconomic backgrounds of 
both the respondents and the persons they named. A total of 645 nominations 
were to sample members; they were made by 279 sample members. However, because 
of missing data, not all of these nominations can be tabulated in each who-to-whcm 
table. As a result, the tables are based on relatively small portions of the 
data, and it is impossible to control for sector, as we have done elsewhere in 
the paper. Obviously, our conclusions must be tentative.
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We have constructed a who-to-whom table for each class and status variable,
and we have run each table in two different ways, one with the nomination as
the unit that is counted (hence, respondents contribute unequally to the table)
and one with the respondent as that unit (weighting his or her nominations in
inverse proportion to their number). Space constraints prevent a full
presentation of these tables, but some representative results, for father's
social class, are presented as Table 3. The results are quite consistent for
2all the tables: There is no trace of a systematic pattern. None of the X 
values is significant; none, in fact, even borders on significance.
Inspection of the percentages reveals variations that are too weak and 
inconsistent to support even a qualified conclusion on behalf of homophily, as 
Table 3 illustrates.
In sum, there is no evidence here of homophily along lines determined by 
social origins. The fact that this conclusion is based on tables constructed 
from only parts of the data is partly redeemed by the consistency of the 
results. Although they are far from definitive, our results suggest that elite 
interaction patterns may be constrained by instrumental interests.' Many writings 
about elites which presume a cohesion within ethnic- or class-derived groups 
assume that elite interactions are based to some degree on "elective affinity." 
But our results imply to us that instrumental interests may counteract the 
"taste" for others like oneself, and consequently cohesion based on social 
origins may be only of minor magnitude within the elite.
Conclusion
The relation of political power to the other axes of stratification is 
one of the classic issues in sociology and political science, dating back at 
least as far as the famous dictum in The Communist Manifesto that, "political
power, properly so-called, is merely the organized power of one class for
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oppressing another." The perspective inherent in this remark has influenced 
many descriptions of the American elite. It is visible in such well-known 
works as C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite and those of G. William Domnoff, 
and in many related pieces of empirical research (e.g., Domhoff, 1975). The 
point of view these represent is a familiar one, but not the only one. We 
start with it because it offers a useful background to the empirical findings 
we have presented here.
To begin with, this point of view is generally taken to imply a link 
between social origins and elite recruitment. Its adherents tend to identify 
the elite as extremely selective in terms of the social origins of its personnel, 
with social class of origin an especially important criterion of entry. Dye's 
work emphasizes this fundamental point as he finds that at least 25% of elites 
in major sectors come from upper class origins (1979: 169-70). This perspective 
also identifies a mechanism through which such narrow recruitment occurs.
Namely, selection is accomplished through special socialization agencies, such 
as select priva .e schools, which provide individuals with the social and cultural 
wherewithal to qualify as potential elite members. These institutions are, by 
and large, open chiefly to those of privileged origins.
Our research on the class and status origins of the American elite has
produced results that agree in part with but also differ in part from this
familiar portrayal. Agreement seems strongest on the selectivity of the elite.
As others have noted, the children of professionals, proprietors, and managers 
are overrepresented in the elite, as are individuals with highly educated parents. 
But none of these concentrations of individuals with favored status origins 
seems sharp enough to impart a dominant character to the elite.
Such a character does appear in our findings on father's social class,
and here too we are in broad agreement with the familiar portrayal. Truly
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striking is the proportion of individuals whose fathers were owners of 
businesses. Such persons make up about half the elite sample, and although we 
are unable to determine precise U.S. population figures to compare against 
the sample, it is obvious that the children of owners are highly 
overrepresented. This seems especially true for the sons and daughters of 
those we have labeled "capitalists," employers of 10 or more persons. This 
concentration along .lines determined by class of origin becomes even more 
sharply defined when we include the children of managers into our reckoning. 
Thus, the children of men who controlled either property or the work of others 
make up an astounding 85% of the elite sample.
But we differ from the familiar portrait on the precise nature of class 
advantages. Domhoff and others describe elite selectivity in terms of a very- 
small group of extremely privileged families, the upper class, whose members . 
are highly overrepresented in the elite although they are not a majority of 
it. We have found a broader stream of recruitment, from the families of 
business owners. This produces a considerable overrepresentation of individuals 
who do not have upper-class origins— for example, the children of farm owners 
or of the petit bourgeoisie. It also leads to a stronger representation of a 
class group within the elite than is true of the upper class, as the children 
of business owners form a majority or a near majority of nearly all elite 
sectors.
Our findings are also at variance with the familiar portrait on the impact 
of social origins on current position and influence within the elite. We are 
unable to find much impact, despite the abundant evidence that class and status 
origins affect elite recruitment. We have examined the relation of social 
origins to activities and organizational memberships that might either reflect 
or magnify an elite individual's influence. Examples of the indicators we have
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considered are the number of times a person has testified before Congress and 
memberships in exclusive social clubs. But the background variables are only 
occasionally related to these indicators and even these few relations are 
modest in magnitude. The same basic pattern is found in our analysis of 
interaction within the elite, both in the analysis of aggregated sociometric 
indicators and in our homophily analysis. In short, we find little or no 
evidence that the influence of those with privileged origins is consolidated 
further by informal patterns of elite interaction or the solidarity cultivated 
in exclusive institutions.
Finally, although this is not clear from the empirical findings we have 
presented, we differ from the familiar portrait on the mechanisms giving rise 
to elite selectivity. This is an important difference because the selective 
character of the elite with respect to class origins is a phenomenon that 
demands some explanation. As we noted before, Domhoff and others explain the 
class selectivity of the elite in large part by pointing to the role of 
specific instit .tions in channeling individuals into the elite. These 
institutions, it is argued, provide individuals with a cultural patina shared 
by elite members and with a set of connections, ultimately including some to 
potential sponsors within the elite, that assist in elite entry. Chief among 
these institutions are schools, and this explanation takes on added 
plausibility since very specific educational credentials seem prerequisites 
for elite positions in some other societies like France and England (Bottomore, 
1964). But the evidence on behalf of this explanation is not very compelling 
as far as the U.S. is concerned. Only a small proportion (10%) of our sample 
has attended an exclusive private school, and even the proportion who attended 
a high-quality college (37%) is not large. As we indicated earlier, class and 
status origins are related to the prestige and quality of the educational
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institutions an elite individual has attended. We suspect that having 
attended a prestigious school is a definite advantage for entry into the elite. 
Nonetheless, the representation of individuals with this sort of education does 
not seem large enough to account for class advantage.
Two other categories of explanation, involving culture and wealth, seem 
plausible to us, although we can only advocate them in a speculative way.
The influence of cultural values on social position is an important theme in 
sociology, and has been discussed often in relation to ethnic differences in 
mobility (cf. Steinberg, 1974). In that context, a critical distinction has 
been made between groups with entrepreneurial experiences in their countries 
of origin, eastern European Jews being perhaps the preeminent example, and 
those without those experiences, such as Southern Italians (Schooler, 1976).
A classic argument traces the broad mobility differences between these groups 
to the cultural values engendered by these different backgrounds. We see 
the possibility of a similar argument in relation to entry into the elite, 
although we are not certain as to the exact details. In its essence, such an 
argument would depend on an outlook specific to the controllers of property 
(and perhaps also controllers of persons). Involved would be such factors as 
attraction to risk, commitment to the notion of a "career" that is independent 
of a specific organizational context, and a high value placed on control over 
the lives of others and over one's own work.
Wealth, of course, is useful in many concrete ways, such as the attainment 
of an elite education. Further, wealth and other material resources may interact 
with or even make possible the outlook that predisposes some toward an elite 
career. We have no direct data on inherited wealth in our sample, and in all 
probability the bulk of the sample members with owner fathers did not inherit 
great wealth (a majority of these fathers were in the "petty bourgeois" category).
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But is is likely that most of the children of owners inherited some wealth.
In our view, wealth is significant in that it enables individuals to weather 
the vicissitudes of an elite career, especially in its early stages, when the 
improbability of success may drive men and women of lower social origins into a 
more stable career path.
To sum up, we believe that the major value of our research on the class 
and status origins of the American elite is in documenting the significant 
advantages enjoyed by the children of business owners, rather than merely the 
scions of the upper class, in attaining a national elite position in the 
United States. However, additional research is required to delineate the 
precise mechanisms through which such origins facilitate an elite career.
It is also essential to examine further the consequences of this class selection 
for policy-influencing and policy-making behavior.
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Footnotes
1. Detailed descriptions of the universe for all sectors are given by Barton
(1974); capsule descriptions are presented by Moore (1979: Table 1). The
descriptions of a few sectors here may help to give the flavor of the 
study design. The universe for the political appointees sector, for 
example, included Secretaries, Under- and Assistant Secretaries, and 
General Counsels of Cabinet departments as well as heads and deputy heads 
of independent agencies. The civil servants sector included individuals 
in the two highest civil service grades (GS 17 and 18) from all Cabinet 
departments and independent agencies. In industrial corporations, the 
chief executive officers of the 500 largest corporations comprised the 
universe.
2. In classifying respondents, we use information they provided on a vita 
form pertaining to the work of their fathers when the respondents were
16 years old. Specifically, they were asked about their fathers: Was he
self-employed? Did he employ others? Number he employed? Did he 
supervise others? The information gathered by these questions was 
sufficient to classify the class origins of nearly 80% of the positional 
sample members.
3. The parental education and occupation variables are constructed from the
considerable information about family background that respondents provided 
on the vita form. The information about parental education is straight­
forward, but some of the information about father's occupation (when the 
respondent was 16 years old) is coded according to somewhat unconventional 
categories. We report these unconventional categories below, followed 
immediately in each case by the occupational categories in which we have 
placed them: "subprofessional (nurse, surveyor, personnel)," professional;
"armed services, policemen, firemen, other protective services," blue 
collar; "unemployed, disabled," blue collar; "politics," professional; 
"business man, no further information," managerial. It should be noted 
that the number of respondents classified in these unconventional categories 
is very small (N=20).
For each of the background variables, the percentage of missing data is as 
follows: father's occupation, 10.3%; father's education, 15.5%' mother's
education, 16.9%.
4. In terms of age, the American population selected for comparison is that 
part over 40 at the time of the elite interviews. These are men born 
before 1932.
Some of the occupational categories in the elite sample and the NORC 
surveys are not precisely comparable. The farm owner category in the 
elite sample includes only owners of farms, while in the NORC surveys this 
category includes farm tenants as well. Also, the NORC survey does not 
have a separate category for proprietors, but combines these with managers.
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Footnotes (cont'd)
5. The standard is less than fully exact for two reasons not mentioned in the 
text. The study used by Wright and Perrone includes women and excludes 
persons out of the labor force. The inclusion of women undoubtedly depresses' 
the class distribution by comparison with that which holds for men only, 
while the exclusion of those out of the labor force probably works in the 
other direction, as individuals primarily in the lowest class category are 
dropped from the sample. We are uncertain as to the overall effect of these 
two features of the study.
6. Some readers may find it puzzling that the two occupational categories of 
ownership (proprietors and farm owners) contain a smaller percentage of the 
sample than do the categories of ownership for the class variable. The dis­
crepancy is explained by the fact that many respondents whose fathers were 
self-employed described the kind of work their fathers did (e.g., lawyer, 
butcher) in answering the occupational question. In short, the discrepancy 
results from a meaningful distinction between the class and status dimensions. 
The same point holds for differences between the managerial categories.
7. The variables are: GENRES, generations of residence in the U.S. (range 1-4
with 1 = foreign born, 4 = 4 or more generations), PREPSCHL (1 = attended 
elite prep school, 0 = did not attend one), COLLEGE, quality of college 
attended (1 = attended high prestige college, 0 = did not attend one), OWNED, 
years of education, AGE (in years), ELITEORG, number of memberships in 17 
elite policy-planning organizations, FEDADV, the number of memberships on 
federal advisory committees, TESTCONG, number of Congressional testimonies 
given (1-3, 1 = 0 ,  2 = 1 ,  3 = 2+), COMMOUT, level of communications output 
(1-7 with 1 = low), CORPDIR, number of corporate directorships held, NONPROF, 
number of nonprofit directorships held, ELCLUBS, elite club membership
(0 = no, 1 = yes), INTVOTES, number of interaction nominations received from 
other sample members (0-5 with 0 = 0 ,  1 = 1...5 = 5+), REPVOTES, number of 
reputation nominations received from other sample members (0-5 as in INTVOTES), 
CENTRAL C, central circle membership (0 = no, 1 = yes). The central circle, 
a key featuia of the elite network, is described in detail by Moore (1979).
The lists of elite prep schools and clubs are taken from Domhoff 1971, chapter 
1.
8. In our regression results for mother's and father's education, we have provided 
finer breakdowns of these variables than we report in Table 1.
9. Because the elite sample is actually composed of separate sector samples, 
sector is controlled throughout the analyses reported in this section.
10. Respondents were not constrained in making these nominations. They were, for 
example, allowed to make as many nominations as they liked and were not 
provided with predefined lists of names from which to choose.
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Regression of social background, current activities, and sociometric 
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omitted category contains those whose fathers had post-graduate
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Table 3
The who-to--whom tables for father's social class
a. nominations counted
nominee's class background
capitalist
petty
bourgeois managerial worker
capitalist 30.9% 23.5 35.3 10.3 (68)
'ominator's
petty
bourgeois 30.3 31.6 31.6 6.6 (76)
class
background managerial 23.4 29.7 34.2 12.6 (111)
worker 30.6 30.6 30.6 8.2 (49)
2X =4.36 with 9 d.f. (p > .8)
b. respondents counted
nominee's class background
capitalist
petty
bourgeois managerial worker
capitalist 33.3% 17.1 38.5 11.0 (37)
nominator's
petty
bourgeois 32.4 27.4 33.9 6.3 (45)
class
background managerial 20.4 28.7 36.6 14.3 (60)
worker 27.8 37.7 30.7 3.8 (27)
2X =7.63 with 9 d.f. (p > .5)
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